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Abstract 
The corporate governance system in Russia, having evolved through years, can be 
characterized by the following features: the dominant role of the concentrated own-
ership structure, corporate supervision relying on a combination of ownership func-
tion and company management, the significant role of the state as the owner, and 
the fairly marginal relevance of external market mechanisms. Those features result 
partly from particular legal solutions and partly from the unwritten, informal cus-
toms or patterns of behaviour of the so-called informal institutions.  
The article’s main thrust is to analyse selected informal institutions which were 
considered the most significant from the Russian corporate governance system point 
of view. These are, among others: the tendency not to obey the rights of minority 
shareholders, informal relationships of enterprises with authorities of various levels, 
and corruption. The author assumes that informal institutions decide upon the spec-
ificity of the corporate governance system in Russia and its particular elements, and 
upon the efficient functioning of supervisory mechanisms. 
Keywords:  informal institutions, shareholder rights, state, corruption 
JEL Classification: B52, K23, L22 
1. Introduction 
The economic transformation in Russia, apart from the fact that it resulted in estab-
lishing the main elements of a market economy, also enabled the creation and de-
velopment of the corporate governance system. Having evolved over the years, 
                                                          
1 The article was prepared as part of the research project: “Evolution of corporate governance system in Russia’, 
financed from the resources of the National Science Centre (decision no DEC-2013/11/N/HS4/03327). 
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many specific features of the system have been shaped, such as: the dominant role 
of the concentrated ownership structure, the reliance of corporate supervision on 
a combination of ownership and management, the significant role of the state as 
owner, and the fairly marginal relevance of external market mechanisms. 
The key characteristics of corporate governance in Russia are, on the one hand, 
the result of certain legal regulations concerning the corporate sector. On the other 
hand, however, they emerge from the unwritten, informal customs or patterns of 
behaviour of the so-called informal institutions. When the role of corporate legisla-
tion is being defined in the literature, informal institutions are usually an ignored 
element in the analysis of the corporate governance system in Russia, which may 
also be observed in relation to highly developed countries and the governance sys-
tems they developed. 
The article’s main thrust is to analyse selected informal institutions which were 
considered the most significant from the Russian corporate governance system point 
of view. The descriptive research method was used, mainly on the basis of Russian 
scientific publications and international organizations’ reports. The author assumes 
that informal institutions influence the specificity of the corporate governance sys-
tem in Russia and its particular elements and upon the efficient functioning of su-
pervisory mechanisms. In the first part of the article, the role of institutions in cor-
porate governance was explained. The second part includes a short description of 
the corporate governance system in Russia. The third part describes selected infor-
mal institutions, crucial from the Russian corporate governance system point of 
view. 
2. Informal institutions as an element of corporate governance 
systems 
Any analysis of a corporate governance system should include institutions. It will 
consequently enable the demonstration of its full specificity. According to the most 
frequently quoted definition developed by North, institutions are frames invented 
by people which shape political, economic, and social interactions.2 Institutions are 
patterns of behaviour imposed from the outside or adopted by entities as their own 
when they are focused on their own benefits.3 The literature divides institutions into 
formal and informal.4 Formal institutions include: constitutions, laws, and property 
rights. Informal institutions, on the other hand, are unwritten constraints, such as: 
sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, or codes of conduct.  
                                                          
2 D.C. North, Institutions, “The Journal of Economic Perspectives”, 1991, Vol. 5, No 1, p. 97. 
3 E. Gruszewska, Instytucje a proces tworzenia kapitału w Polsce, Wydawnictwo UwB, Białystok 2013, 
pp. 106–107, 112. 
4 D.C. North, op. cit. 
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The evolution of a corporate governance system is influenced by certain insti-
tutions, either formal or informal. The evaluation of the role of formal institutions 
mostly demands an analysis of the legal system. Legal acts for joint-stock compa-
nies, the banking system and creditor protection, and the possibility to participate 
in ownership of certain entities, e.g. banks or the capital market, including demands 
related to its transparency and protection of interests, have a direct or indirect impact 
on corporate governance and determine the relationships between particular stake-
holders.5 Additionally, national governance systems are influenced by regulations 
concerning state-owned companies, bankruptcy, reporting requirements (account-
ing), competition policy, and antitrust policy. 
Informal institutions also influence the specificity of national corporate gov-
ernance systems. Incorporating informal institutions into their research allows re-
searchers to partially explain the characteristic features of certain internal govern-
ance mechanisms, the efficiency of market mechanisms’ activity, and the level of 
law enforcement, abuses and informal practices. Informal institutions may, on the 
one hand, improve the quality of corporate governance in a particular country, es-
pecially when formal institutions are not fully efficient e.g. legal solutions. On the 
other hand, however, they are also able to undermine or distort the activities of for-
mal governance institutions, including the legal system.6 The full role of informal 
institutions in corporate governance has not been properly verified yet (if it is pos-
sible at all) and the study of relationships between informal institutions and corpo-
rate governance practice is still rare and has been conducted only in recent years, 
however, they undoubtedly are essential and can serve to acknowledge the exact 
specificity of particular national governance systems. 
3. Brief characteristics of corporate governance in Russia 
The dominant mechanism of corporate governance in Russia is the ownership struc-
ture. According to the results of research conducted by every leading scientific re-
search centre in Russia,7 the ownership structure of companies in Russia is charac-
terized by a relatively high level of concentration, which results in the dominant 
owner exercising control over the company. Dominant owners participate directly 
in managing companies, which results in a combination of ownership and control. 
The demand for external managers who are not owners is very much limited.8 A sig-
nificant aspect in the analysis of the ownership structure of companies in Russia is 
                                                          
5 M. Aluchna, Prawo w systemie corporate governance, “Miesięcznik Kapitałowy”, Styczeń 2011, pp. 68–69. 
6 S. Estrin, M. Prevezer, The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil, Russia, India 
and China compared, “Asia Pacific Journal of Management” 2011, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 52–53. 
7 Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Centre for Eco-
nomic and Financial Research at New Economic School in Moscow, Gaidar Institute for Economic Pol-
icy, Russian Economic Barometer. 
8 Т.Г. Долгопятова, Концентрация собственности в российской промышленности: эволюционные 
изменения на микроуровне, “Журнал Новой Экономической Ассоциации” 2010, No. 8, p. 80. 
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the participation of the state in this ownership.  State companies function in every 
sector of the economy and prevail in industries such as: infrastructure, extraction, 
arms, financial services and the media. 
In the Russian corporate governance system, the capital market and the market 
for corporate control perform a secondary role, mainly because of the relatively 
slow development of individual market institutions and low standards of observing 
minority shareholders’ rights. The capital market in Russia is considered to be rel-
atively narrow in terms of sector diversification and variety.9 The market is domi-
nated by industries in the following sectors: extraction, petroleum, gas and construc-
tion. 
4. Selected informal institutions as an element of corporate 
governance systems in Russia 
One of the main problems concerning the Russian corporate governance system is 
not the question of the quality of legal acts but the actual practice of implementing 
and executing the law (правоприменение). It is caused by the fact that the function-
ing of the Russian corporate sector depends on informal practices which are not 
transparent to outsiders and can be treated as abusive in the field of corporate gov-
ernance. Those institutions had a great impact on the redistribution of ownership, 
especially in the 1990s, by not allowing outsiders to participate in ownership. They 
also indirectly affected the character of other corporate governance mechanisms. 
The level of protection of private owners’ rights is one of the essential factors 
determining the quality of corporate governance in Russia.10 The problem of owner-
ship rights protection is extremely important for Russia, because the concentrated 
ownership structure is typical for Russian companies with one or a few majority stake-
holders. Inefficient legal institutions combined with weakly developed market mech-
anisms result in the occurrence of opportunistic behaviours towards minority share-
holders. Present in Russian companies, especially in the 1990s,11 the following iden-
tified methods of not obeying minority shareholders’ rights can be distinguished: 
(1) transferring incomplete or untrue information concerning the company, 
(2) not obeying procedural requirements when voting at the General Share-
holders’ Meeting, 
(3) imposing charges for shareholders’ participation in the General Meeting 
or establishing a minimal number of blocks of shares allowing them to 
vote for the governing bodies, 
                                                          
9 ИЭПП, Внешние механизмы корпоративного управления: некоторые прикладные проблемы, 
Научные труды No. 104, Москва 2006, p. 21, http://www.iep.ru/ru/vneshnie-me-anizmy-korpora 
tivnogo-upravleniya-nauchnye-trudy-104.html (accessed: August 25, 2010). 
10 НСКУ, Корпоративное управление в современной России: опыт и перспективы, Москва 2007, 
pp. 30–31. 
11 А. Радыгин, В. Гутник, Г. Мальгинов, Постприватизационная структура акционерного капитала 
и корпоративный контроль: контрреволюция управляющих, “Вопросы экономики” 1995, No. 10, 
pp. 57–59; А.А. Яковлев, Агенты модернизации, Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, Москва 2006, p. 100. 
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(4) manipulating shareholders’ votes in order to gain the right to full manage-
ment of votes, 
(5) infringement of proper dividend payment order, 
(6) the so-called ‘dilution’ of blocks of shares belonging to minority share-
holders, i.e. reducing the profit from one share, e.g. by issuing extra shares, 
(7) creating obstacles for the external sale of shares by their owners, 
(8) bogus companies issuing and allocating new shares at a lowered price 
without informing shareholders, 
(9) manipulating shareholders’ registers, 
(10) adopting provisions in articles of associations that discriminate certain 
groups of shareholders, 
(11) infringement of provisions related to the election of members to the board 
of directors, 
(12) obstacles for allowing external investors to the boards of directors, 
(13) opposing the external independent financial audit of joint-stock company 
activity, 
(14) the selling of a joint-stock company’s assets at lowered value by bogus 
companies or to bogus buyers, without giving prior notice to other share-
holders. 
After the crisis of 1998, further infringements of shareholders’ rights were 
committed, including, among others: issuing securities without their state registra-
tion, activity on the securities market without holding the proper license of a pro-
fessional market participant, violations committed by registrants, charging higher 
prices for services, violations committed by depositaries, not obeying transparency 
requirements by the state. All those examples may be regarded as the attempts made 
by regional authorities to cancel the issue of securities.12 
General assessments of the level of obeying shareholders’ rights and freedoms 
in Russia are made by selected international institutions. Such information is deliv-
ered by, among others, the International Property Rights Index. Russia’s position 
concerning the general index seems to be very low – 63rd out of 70 surveyed coun-
tries in 2007 (with an index value 3.2 out of 10), and 81st out of 129 countries sur-
veyed in 2015 (4.5 out of 10), which puts Russia in 14th place in the group of 19 
surveyed countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Table 1). A detailed analysis of 
the described index components explains Russia’s low assessment results. The low-
est scores, both in 2007 and in 2015, were given in the field connected with judicial 
independence and corruption control.  
Since 2006, also within the Doing Business report conducted by the World 
Bank, the level of protection of investors’ rights has been studied (connected with 
the protection of minority shareholders’ rights against abuses carried out by man-
agers and majority shareholders). The assessment of this index in Russia fluctuates 
around grade 5 (where the highest possible grade equals 10). While in 2007 Russia 
occupied the 60th position out of 175 surveyed countries, in recent research it has 
 
                                                          
12 А. Радыгин, Перераспределение прав собственности в постприватизационной России, “Вопросы 
экономики” 1999, No. 6, p. 73. 
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been 100th out of 189 surveyed countries. This may mean that other countries are 
systematically improving standards when it comes to obeying investors’ rights and 
Russia does not show any true progress in this field (Figure 1). 
Table 1. International Property Rights Index for Russia in 2007–2015. 
 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
Index value 3.2 
(63) 
4.1 
(87) 
4.6 
(93) 
4.5 
(101) 
4.5 
(81) 
Number of surveyed countries 70 115 129 130 129 
Explanatory note: Russian position in rankings was given in brackets. 
Source:  Own elaboration on the basis of International Property Rights Index. Reports 2007–2015, 
Property Rights Alliance, http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/partners (accessed: 
February 26, 2016). 
Figure 1. Investors Protection Index according to the Doing Business reports in the selected 
countries in 2006–2014. 
 
Explanatory notes: in 2006 155 countries were examined within the Doing Business report, 
whereas in 2014 189 countries. 
Source: own elaborations on the basis of: The World Bank, Doing Business, 2006–2014, http://www 
.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business (accessed: February 26, 2016). 
The infringement of minority shareholders’ rights by dominant shareholders 
still constitutes a serious problem for corporate relationships in Russian companies. 
It is indicated both by international comparative studies and studies conducted by 
Russian research institutions. For foreign investors, the belief in abuses committed 
by the managers of Russian companies is the main obstacle when it comes to in-
vesting in Russia.13 
Strong relationships between companies and authorities at all levels are the 
characteristic feature of the Russian corporate governance system. They exist not 
only due to the direct participation of the state in selected mechanisms of corporate 
                                                          
13 НСКУ, Национальный доклад по корпоративному управлению, Выпуск 6, Москва 2013, pp. 80, 
242–265. 
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governance (company ownership structure, boards of directors, the corporate gov-
ernance market, and the capital market), but also in the form of corruption as well 
as informal bonds and relationships from the period of the centrally planned econ-
omy and that were partly developed in the period of the economic transformation. 
Kurbatova and Levin distinguish three spheres of mutual relationships between 
authorities and companies: the so-called white sphere (covering formal practices 
and relationships that result from legal acts), the black sphere (informal practice 
with a criminal character, especially corruption, the setting up of private companies 
by clerks who then benefit from the performed function), the grey sphere (collecting 
informal payments from companies, not directly connected with corruption, and in-
formal connections between companies and authorities).14 
Within the grey sphere, the authorities-companies relationships are marked by 
the inter-relation of formal and informal norms and rules, by the dominance of the 
former, and the character of informal relationships that does not directly breach le-
gal norms. Such a model of relationships between authorities at various levels and 
companies can lead to certain consequences for corporate governance – in the field 
of ownership redistribution, filling posts in boards of directors, obtaining credit, 
transactions on the corporate governance market, or taking advantage of the bank-
ruptcy mechanisms. 
Within the 20 years that have passed since the beginning of the economic trans-
formations in Russia, the grey sphere was composed of three stages of shaping the 
informal bonds between authorities at various levels and the corporate sector. The 
first stage covered the 1990s (until the crisis of 1998) and is referred to as ‘state 
capture’ (захват государства). It was typical in that period for entrepreneurs to 
have an impact on the creation of legal acts or on authorities’ statements for trans-
actions connected with privatization.15 This kind of model was possible on condi-
tion that the state was weak and was not able to oppose the impact of private interest 
groups. 
In the period of the most intensive privatization (1993–1995), during the pres-
idency of Boris Yeltsin, close connections were established between the first oli-
garchs and the emerging capital groups with authorities, which let them directly 
influence state politics. After the crisis, especially in the early 2000s, a considerable 
alteration in the character of informal relations between authorities and entrepre-
neurs took place (the so-called взаимовыгодного обмена stage, mutually beneficial 
for both parties). It started to become obvious that there was a division of big com-
panies and capital groups into those that were loyal to the authorities and all the rest, 
with respect to the rule of ‘equal remoteness’ of companies from the authorities.16 
Together with the acquisition of power, President Putin began numerous processes 
that were to alter the essence of the relationship between the state and the sector of 
                                                          
14 М. Курбатова, С. Левин, Деформализация правил взаимодействия власти и бизнеса, “Вопросы 
экономики” 2005, No. 10, pp. 119–120. 
15 А.А. Яковлев, Эволюция стратегий взаимодействия бизнеса и власти в российской экономике, 
“Российский журнал менеджмента” 2005, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 28. 
16 Ibidem, p. 37. 
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big enterprises. One of the signs of those alterations was the so-called Pact from 
July 28, 2000 concluded between Putin and 19 owners of big enterprises, which 
aimed to regulate new mutual relations.17 
After the year 2000, the possibilities of taking advantage of informal contacts 
by owners of the biggest Russian companies and groups with representatives of the 
public authorities did not become weaker but they underwent transformations, i.e. 
they moved their influences from the federal authorities to regional ones.18 From 
the second half of 2003, a gradual change in state-companies’ relationships began. 
It was indicated by the consolidation and nationalization of numerous groups and 
companies (as well as the recovery of formerly lost assets) and the creation of new 
state-owned holding companies. Additionally, there were staff changes in state-
owned companies and groups. This period, especially after the crisis of 2008, is 
referred to as ‘enterprise capture’ (захват предприятий). It is the result of the con-
tinuing expansion of the state in the Russian economy and it means that, in practice, 
no big enterprise can function and take important decisions without the consent of 
the state.19 
One of the signs of the strong relationships between the companies sector and 
the authorities is corruption. Corruption is considered to be the main obstacle for 
the development of a system of corporate governance and investment in Russia by 
foreign entities. It leads to the bad international reputation of the country in this 
field. 
Diegtiarev and Malikov, when studying corruption in the Russian economy, 
suggest understanding it as:20 a systemic, overall economic phenomenon that de-
scribes the measures of inefficiency of public institutions and the legal system 
(a transaction cost), the set of strategies for the functioning of particular social 
groups which aim at making use of public services, and clerks taking advantage of 
the rights that are linked with their post, which means taking certain decisions that 
may breach legislation or unwritten legal norms in order to gain private financial 
advantage. 
An assessment of the level of corruption in Russia is partly possible thanks to 
the Corruption Perception Index analysis made by Transparency International. Ac-
cording to the results of the research carried out for Russia, it is a country with 
a very high intensity of corruption. Over the years 1996–2011, the index value did 
not exceed 3 points (out of a possible 10), and in the years 2012–2013 30 points 
(out of a possible 100), which shows that Russia is considered a highly corrupt 
country. The index values deteriorated after the two crises – in 2000 and in the years  
                                                          
17 В. Волков, Проблема надежных гарантий прав собственности и российский бариант вартикальной 
политической интеграции, “Вопросы экономики” 2010, No. 8, pp. 13–14. 
18 W. Konończuk, “Sprawa Jukosu”: przyczyny i konsekwencje, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Prace 
OSW Nr 25, Warszawa 2006, p. 10, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_25_0.pdf (accessed: 
December 3, 2014). 
19 А. Яковлев, Ю. Симачев, Ю. Данолив, Российская корпорация: модели поведения в условиях 
кризиса, “Вопросы экономики” 2009, No. 6, p. 75. 
20 А. Дегтярев, Р. Маликов, Институциональный анализ деловой коррупции в России, “Вопросы 
экономики” 2005, No. 10, pp. 104–106. 
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2008–2010. In 2015, with a result of 29 points, Russia found itself in 119th place 
out of 168 countries.21 Its results have not improved in spite of progress in economic 
reforms or changes in legislation made after the 2008 crisis. 
According to the research carried out by the INDEM fund (Информатика для 
демокрации), the value of the corruption market of the Russian public sector in 2001 
amounted to almost 34 bln dollars and at the turn of 2004 and 2005 to almost 320 bln 
dollars, which meant an increase of almost 9.5 times.22 The amount given as a bribe 
rose significantly as well – from 10 to almost 136 thousand dollars, despite the drop 
in the average number of bribes given. At the turn of 2004 and 2005, the value of the 
corruption market of the Russian public sector constituted 54% of Russia’s GDP. 
The analysis of public sector corruption at the public authority level indicates 
that at the beginning of the previous decade, the biggest value of corruption was 
connected with authorities at the municipal level – about 75% of the whole corrup-
tion market of the Russian public sector in 2002 (about 20% at the regional level 
and 5% at federal level).23 In line with Troika Dialog investment bank’s estimations, 
Russia’s reputation as a country decreases market capitalization by about 45 bln 
dollars annually .24 The World Bank’s estimations demonstrate that in 2010, the 
profits from corruption constituted about half of Russia’s GDP. 
From the corporate governance point of view, the corruption of the public sec-
tor is the main negative phenomenon. It makes the corruption sector dependent on 
the authorities at various levels and it should be recognized as a specific feature of 
Russian corporate governance.25 In the coming years it may become the main factor 
limiting the quality of the improvement of corporate governance in Russia. 
The reasons for corruption in Russia may be justified partly by the its past, but also 
by the mistakes in the implemented economic reforms as well as by taking advantage of 
the period of economic reforms and mistakes made by new institutions when taking over 
state assets.26 One of the main factors which escalated corruption in Russia was the com-
mencement of the privatization process. It was a redistribution of state assets that was 
spread over time, which, due to the lack of perfect legal solutions for privatization meth-
ods, led to the abuse of possibilities to dispose of state properties by the clerks. It was 
exacerbated by the scale of privatization and weakness in control over its implementa-
tion. Corruption also had a significant influence on the activity of the corporate govern-
ance market. After the crisis of 1998, it helped the redistribution and consolidation of 
ownership most of all. Due to this, corruption was an efficient tool that enabled illegal 
acquisitions. Additionally, it was used to carry out bankruptcy procedures, especially 
when it helped to limit the independence and work quality of courts. 
                                                          
21 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index: Results, http://www.transparency.org/re 
search/cpi/ (accessed: February 26, 2016). 
22  Во сколько раз увеличилась коррупция за 4 года: результаты нового исследования Фонда 
ИНДЕМ, http://www.indem.ru/corrupt/2005diag_press.htm (accessed: October 22, 2014); Г. Сатаров, 
Как измерать и контролировать коррупцию, “Вопросы экономики” 2007, No. 1, p. 6. 
23 А. Дегтярев, Р. Маликов, op. cit., p. 107. 
24 В. Моисеев, Борьба с коррупцией в России, “Экономическая политика” 2011, No. 2, pp. 99, 112. 
25  С. Гуриев, Что известнo о коррупции в России и можно ли с ней бороться, “Вопросы 
экономики” 2007, No. 1, p. 11. 
26 L. Goczek, Przyczyny korupcji w krajach postkomunistycznych, “Gospodarka Narodowa” 2010, No. 4, p. 67. 
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5. Conclusions 
Over the last twenty-plus years, the main mechanisms and institutions of corporate 
governance in Russia have been developed, and Russian companies, especially pub-
lic ones, are systematically improving their internal governance standards. Russian 
corporate legislation, according to the assessment made by researchers, from a for-
mal point of view, is well enough developed, but there are significant problems with 
its implementation, which still seems to be the main problem of the legal system in 
Russia. 
The specificity of the corporate governance system in Russia depends to a great 
extent on informal institutions, which are not always recognized and which, due to 
informal practices and relations, influence the efficiency of the activities of certain 
governance mechanisms as well as the relationships between them. A significant 
problem is the infringement of minority shareholders’ rights, which constitutes one 
of the main factors that discourage foreign investors, including institutional ones, 
from investing in Russia. Corruption and the tendency to provoke corporate con-
flicts should also be added. In spite of the fact that the research and verification of 
particular informal institutions met many obstacles, it seems necessary to conduct 
further analysis of this issue, because without it, the knowledge of the national cor-
porate governance system is incomplete. 
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